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The Dialogic Community at Dusk 
Peter Ramsay∗ 
Abstract  
Alan Brudner’s Hegelian theory of the “general part” of the criminal law offers a con-
vincing explanation of the form taken by criminal law doctrine in liberal states. Brudner 
explains the general part’s elements in terms of three paradigms of individual freedom 
that together form what he calls a “dialogic community.” I argue here that the prevalence 
of harm-prevention offenses in the U.K.’s actual penal law demonstrates that there is a 
fundamental tension between these paradigms of freedom, one that has undermined the 
claims made for doctrine, the unity of the dialogic community, and the liberal state’s 
commitment to individual freedom. 
Introduction 
Alan Brudner’s Punishment and Freedom1 seeks to explain every major doctrinal controversy 
in the penal law in terms of the realization of individual freedom in a liberal state. Brudner 
developed the book from ideas presented in one chapter of the first edition of his The 
Unity of the Common Law.2 When read together with the new edition of Unity of the Common 
Law3 (UCL) and with Constitutional Goods4 (CG), Brudner’s legal and philosophical scholar-
ship constitutes a unified theory of the overall development of the twentieth century’s 
liberal legal orders. By translating the theoretical content of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right into 
a modern idiom, by applying Hegel’s political theory to the detail of modern common law 
doctrine, and by using that theory to critique and relativize the leading schools of legal 
theory in each of the main branches of law, Brudner has made an unrivalled contribution 
to legal theory. 
As a critique of the predominant moral philosophical theories of criminal law, 
Punishment and Freedom (PF) is compelling and profound. Brudner demonstrates that legal 
threats of state punishment have a political-constitutional significance that is independent 
of the relation between criminal wrongdoing and moral wrongdoing. Both Unity of the 
Common Law and Punishment and Freedom also argue against critical legal theorists’ insistence 
that irreconcilable contradiction is the condition of law. For Brudner, their perspective 
represents a failure of dialectical imagination, a failure to grasp that the contradictions in 
                                                 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, London School of Economics. 
1 Alan Brudner, Punishment and Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice (2009). 
2 Alan Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law: Studies in Hegelian Jurisprudence (1995). 
3 Alan Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law (with Jennifer M. Nadler) (2d rev. ed. 2013).  
4 Alan Brudner, Constitutional Goods (2004). 
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legal doctrines are only the form taken by a higher unity. Notwithstanding the subtlety of 
his Hegelian logic, I think this claim that the law is ultimately unified is misleading.  
The dialectical antithesis and synthesis at the core of his account of freedom, the 
tension that makes his account so compelling when compared with that of moral philoso-
phy, has not proved historically to provide the stable unity that he claims for its logical 
structure. On the contrary, if the evidence of recent developments in penal law is anything 
to go by, this tension has unraveled in a way that represents a mortal danger to a penal law 
that is consistent with individual freedom. Understanding the way that this process devel-
ops in our own time will provide the key to the law of the twenty-first century. 
I. The Penal Law of the Dialogic Community 
Penal laws are commands or threats made by a political sovereign with a monopoly on 
legitimate coercion. The sovereign coerces legitimately only when it coerces in the public 
interest. For Brudner, the public interest is those interests necessarily shared by all subjects, 
by virtue of some common nature, which he calls “public reason.” In a distinctively liberal 
political community that shared interest will be individual freedom. A liberal political the-
ory of punishment must, therefore, show how the form and content of the public wrongs 
that comprise the substantive criminal law serve rather than undermine the liberal public 
reason of individual freedom. 
To solve the problem of reconciling state coercion with individual freedom, 
Brudner elaborates an account of freedom as a unity of three different “paradigms,” each 
paradigm being logically related to and dependent on the existence of the others. These 
paradigms are “formal agency,” “real autonomy,” and “communal solidarity.” Brudner 
locates the various principles and ideas at work in legal doctrine as arising from one or 
another of these paradigms, and then argues that the whole can be understood as a unity 
of these different component paradigms. 
This framework provides the basis of Brudner’s theory of the common law doc-
trines that are often referred to as the “general part” of the criminal law. I find Brudner’s 
detailed account of the general part convincing. I will briefly consider only those aspects 
that are immediately relevant for understanding the limitations of his theory in respect of 
the criminal law’s contemporary problems and the resources the theory nevertheless con-
tains for solving those problems. The most persuasive feature of Brudner’s theory is that 
his paradigms of formal agency and real autonomy are able to explain features of the 
criminal law that moral theory is unable to explain. Moral theories of criminalization  
either rely on the harm principle and are unable to explain those criminal wrongs (such as 
battery) that can be committed without proof of any harm, or they rely on a moral retrib-
utivism that is unable to explain the entirely harm-oriented public welfare offenses, where 
there may be no moral wrongdoing. These two perspectives similarly struggle to explain 
why negligence is common in the public welfare offenses but traditionally absent from 
what judges sometimes refer to as “true crimes.”  
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Brudner’s elaboration of the paradigms of formal agency and real autonomy  
resolves both these problems. As formal agents, human individuals are able to act inde-
pendently of any particular end: they enjoy a “negative” freedom to choose ends. Free of 
any particular ends, we are ends in ourselves—persons possessed of a unique dignity by vir-
tue of this independence of any particular ends. Protection and recognition of the rights 
of personhood (or end-status) is an interest that is necessarily shared by all subjects in a 
liberal political community. This theory has no difficulty in explaining the harmless wrong 
of battery as a coercion of this formal agency.  
Formal agency also explains why some offenses require proof of intention, 
knowledge, or subjective recklessness even though, as H.L.A. Hart argued, negligence lia-
bility would ensure that more harm-causing behavior was deterred while punishment was 
nevertheless fairly distributed.5 The absence of negligence in these offenses is explained, 
Brudner argues, by their not being concerned to deter harm, but rather to impose a re-
tributive response to the coercion of formal agency.  
From the point of view of a liberal sovereignty, when one person coerces anoth-
er’s agency by an assault, a homicide, or a deliberate taking of or damage to the other’s 
property without consent, she not only violates that particular other’s rights, but also 
makes a claim to a liberty unlimited by the rights of the other person. In other words, 
when a person deliberately interferes with another’s rights, she practically denies the exist-
ence of rights as such. The sovereign’s purpose in punishing the offender is to realize the 
authority of rights by visiting the rights-denial on the offender who claimed it. The pun-
ishment is rendered consistent with the freedom of all because the offender has 
authorized it by her own denial of rights. This is not true, however, if force is applied or 
property interfered with negligently, for this is merely a violation of a right without any 
implied claim to an unlimited liberty that would require or authorize the sovereign to  
negate it with punishment.  
Brudner calls this retributive account of crime and punishment “legal retributiv-
ism,” to distinguish it from the moral retributivism that dominates Anglo-American penal 
theory. The offender is not punished for the reason that she morally deserves it. Punish-
ment is legally “deserved” only insofar as a deprivation of the offender’s rights will serve 
to realize the nullity that was the offender’s own denial of rights.  
This is a penal theory that also explains the shape taken by actus reus doctrines such 
as the limits on omissions liability and inchoate offenses. Where the paradigm of formal 
agency is concerned, punishment must be a response to a choice to deny rights, rather 
than to a mere failure to confer a benefit on another, as in many cases of omitting to help 
another. The choice must also be a choice that takes manifest external form in the world, 
so that it amounts to a practical denial of another’s rights. Without this external public 
form, a merely private choice to deny rights, such as making intentional preparations to 
offend, never becomes a practical denial of rights that the sovereign is either required, or 
                                                 
5 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968). 
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implicitly authorized by the offender, to negate by punishment. As a consequence, com-
mon law attempts doctrine has tended to restrict liability to acts that manifest externally 
the choice to deny rights.6  
Formal agency is, however, a radically incomplete theory of individual freedom. 
Following Hegel, Brudner argues convincingly that the negative freedom from external 
determination of ends is incoherent without the positive freedom of actually authoring 
one’s own ends. To be truly free, a person must not only be free from causal determina-
tion so as to enjoy the capacity to choose their own ends, but also pursue ends that they 
have determined for themselves. This second aspect of freedom, Brudner calls “real  
autonomy” and, from the logical unity of formal agency and real autonomy, Brudner is 
able to give an account of almost every aspect of the criminal law that would not make 
sense were the law based on formal agency alone.  
Harm is at the center of the real autonomy paradigm because making self-
determined choices depends on enjoying a right of access to certain agency goods, includ-
ing life, limb, food, clothing, shelter, knowledge, skills, health, and so on. Without a right 
to these goods, formally free agents will always be “vulnerable to uncontrollable contin-
gencies” resulting from poverty, disease, and disabling accident (PF, 136). The right to 
these agency goods implies the existence of an extensive welfare state that we will consid-
er below, but it also has distinct implications for the criminal law.  
The most important aspects of the criminal law that real autonomy explains are 
the gradation of offenses according to harm done, harm as a component of proportional 
sentencing, fraud and threat offenses, and the public welfare offenses. These latter offens-
es are concerned to deter behavior that carries an excessive risk of harm to agency goods. 
Since such excessively risky conduct may not necessarily involve a coercion of agency, 
there is no requirement to prove intention or recklessness. Negligence will be enough.7 At 
the same time, where violation of such law is not deliberate, there may be no externaliza-
tion of a denial of rights, and the state has no authorization to deprive a person of 
liberty—only to fine them or impose some equivalent penalty.  
From the same premises, Brudner has explained two types of offenses whose 
form and content are at odds with each other. Brudner shows that antithetical criminal 
law doctrines make sense if they are considered in their concrete legal specificity as the 
coercive threats of a liberal state, rather than in their generic character as instances of 
moral wrongdoing. Criminal punishment is only legitimate if citizens have externalized a 
choice to deny rights; that is, to repudiate the conditions that guarantee the freedom of them-
selves and others. A fine or relevant disqualification of some sort, falling short of 
                                                 
6 Brudner relies on the subsequently overruled New Zealand case of R. v. Barker, [1924] N.Z.L.R. 865. 
However, the English courts’ interpretation of the “more than merely preparatory” test in the Criminal 
Attempts Act 1981 appears to confirm Brudner’s point. See Christopher Clarkson, Attempt: The Conduct 
Element, 29 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 25 (2009). 
7 Brudner rules out absolute liability, notwithstanding that this is common in regulatory offenses in the 
common law world. 
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imprisonment, may nevertheless be imposed for negligent creation of an excessive risk 
that violates publicly guaranteed rights to agency goods.  
Brudner explains most of the criminal defenses as either exculpations in which a 
defendant has not chosen to deny rights, or justifications where despite appearances the 
defendant has chosen to affirm rights rather than deny them. Some defenses are excuses 
and these are explained by means of the third paradigm of “communal solidarity.” Free 
citizens are recognized by the state not only as abstract agents of agency and autonomy, 
but also as concrete embodied individuals with particular “loyalties,” “dispositions,” and 
“aims.” Sometimes for a person to have avoided the commission of a crime would have 
required them to show “an angelic selflessness” (PF, 256-57). The person who does 
wrong under duress, for example, may on that ground be excused because even though 
they deny rights, they nevertheless act “conformably to the public ethics of the life suffi-
cient for dignity” (PF, 261).  
Brudner concedes that communal morality is in this way allowed a peripheral role 
in the third paradigm of communal solidarity. Brudner is here trying to absorb the force 
of one critical school of criminal law theory. Alan Norrie argues that all attempts to pro-
duce a rational, principled account of the criminal law come unstuck because substantive 
moral judgments of a person’s motives or character always creep in to disrupt legal doc-
trines that claim to be concerned with formal rights. Duress is only one of the examples 
of this process that Norrie examines. He also identifies these tensions in the instability of 
doctrinal definitions of intention and recklessness, the limitations of legal concepts of 
voluntariness and automatism, the proliferation of different causation doctrines, and the 
extensive presence of evaluative standards of reasonableness in the defenses.8  
Brudner does not explicitly respond in detail to Norrie’s arguments, although 
some of his discussion of doctrine offers implicit rejoinders. His general response is that 
morality is indeed let into legal doctrine “by the back door,” but that is precisely because 
at most it allows moral excuses to alleviate liability for a legal rights-denial (PF, 259). For 
Brudner, these moral considerations form only the periphery of criminal law and do not 
threaten the core of the law that consists of the rights-protecting laws arising from the 
formal agency and real autonomy paradigms.9 Crucially, Brudner argues that since the 
three paradigms of freedom are logically interdependent, they presuppose the others for 
their own coherence. There is, therefore, no “logical imperative” for the paradigms to im-
pose themselves on the territory of the others. Indeed, “logic requires their [mutual] 
accommodation” (PF, 305).  
It is this claim that is the lynchpin of Brudner’s theory because, as he recognizes, 
there are real antitheses between the paradigms, and the difference between his theory 
and analytical moral theories of criminal law is that Brudner does not pretend that these 
antitheses can or should be eliminated. Instead, he seeks to show that these antitheses are 
                                                 
8 See Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (2d ed. 2001); Alan 
Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice: A Relational Critique chs. 7-8 (2000). 
9 See Alan Brudner, A Reply to the Critics of Punishment and Freedom, 14 New Crim. L. Rev. 498 (2011). 
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moments of a higher unity. The antithetical paradigms are each partial expressions of the 
complex human achievement that is individual freedom in political community—what 
Brudner refers to as a “dialogic community.” However, if the unity of the dialogic 
community should fail, if we should find that the forms of liability appropriate to one 
paradigm appear in the sphere Brudner has reserved for another, then his theory is not 
explaining the penal law. It is at best a normative aspiration for the penal law. If the 
mutual interference of paradigms is extensive and persistent, it might be that his normative 
theory is practically unsustainable for some reason.  
II. The Conflict of the Paradigms in Penal Law 
Even if Brudner could convincingly explain all of Norrie’s examples of invasions of mo-
rality into penal law as essentially marginal phenomena, his claim that the paradigms are 
unified would still have to account for another aspect of criminal law that seems to un-
dermine that unity: the prevalence of harm-prevention offenses where they do not belong. 
Moreover, these offenses indicate that conflict between the paradigms is taking place not 
at what Brudner claims are the margins—between the core rights of freedom and the pe-
ripheral moral excuses—but within the core itself—between the paradigms of formal 
agency and real autonomy. In this conflict, the paradigm of real autonomy appears to 
have extended itself into territory that Brudner has reserved for formal agency. 
Brudner himself briefly sketches what the criminal law would be like if the para-
digm of real autonomy were imposed as the only paradigm of criminal law and all crimes 
were to become public welfare offenses. In such a regime, “[p]reventing harms rather 
than vindicating rights of formal agency becomes the aim of criminal law no less than of 
regulatory law” (PF, 301). The result, Brudner explains would be that:  
the dangerous character rather than the criminal agent becomes the object of penal law 
and its sanctions, which become instruments honed to the aim of incapacitating him, 
preferably before he can strike. Thus, inchoate offences, once an apparent anomaly in a 
regime of punishment, become the norm in a regime of threat control, yet … without the 
robust actus requirement imposed by a law of punishment (PF, 301). 
Where dangerousness is the target of the criminal justice system, there is no need for the 
actus reus requirement to afford proof of an externalized choice to deny rights, and the actus 
requirement “atrophies” (PF, 302). The need for subjective fault also disappears. Within a 
regime of real autonomy it is enough to prove, as Hart had argued, that “the defendant neg-
ligently broke the law … that he failed to comply though it was within his power to do so,” 
with the result that “[s]evere sentences required by a regime aimed at incapacitating human 
threats could be meted out on the basis of ordinary negligence” (PF, 302). 
In recent decades, the criminal law in the U.K. has moved sharply towards limiting 
the influence of the paradigm of formal agency, using exactly the techniques of public wel-
fare offenses that Brudner describes. There has been a steady expansion in the number and 
scope of “preinchoate” criminal offenses. In these offenses, the conduct element does not 
prove an externalization of a choice to deny rights but only that the offender has committed 
some preparatory or facilitating act with the ulterior intention of a subsequent criminal  
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denial of rights,10 or that he is willing to engage in conduct that might result in encouraging 
or facilitating such criminal wrongdoing by others.11 To these, mostly recent, offenses can 
be added a long list of possession offenses of longer standing.12 Most preinchoate offenses 
allow for imprisonment as a penalty.  
In addition, a new form of penal liability has been innovated called the civil pre-
ventive order. This allows a civil court to impose specific individualized obligations on 
individuals assessed as representing a danger of committing terrorism offenses,13 or sexual 
offenses against children,14 or alcohol-related disorder,15 or domestic violence,16 or foot-
ball hooliganism,17 or indeed any “serious crime.”18 These orders can contain any 
obligations that are thought necessary to prevent the materialization of the offending 
conduct, and typically they include curfews, movement restrictions, and restrictions on 
whom a defendant can associate with or what they may possess—and can sometimes in-
clude positive obligations to report changes of address, permit searches of premises, and 
so on. Breach of any of these obligations without reasonable excuse is a criminal offense 
carrying a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Here too the actus atrophies since the 
conduct necessary for a breach of a preventive order is not limited to conduct that exter-
nalizes a choice to deny rights. It will be enough to prove the commission of any act that 
was motivated by such a choice or that could possibly have been motivated by such a choice. 
Moreover, with the preventive orders, the fault requirement is negligence at best.19  
These offenses cannot be regarded as ordinary public welfare offenses, properly 
protecting the agency good of security by deterring excessive risk creation while leaving 
the paradigm of formal agency intact. Their aim is to prevent the specifically criminal wrongs 
                                                 
10 Offenses of intentionally preparing another offense are to be found in respect of terrorism 
(Terrorism Act 2006, § 5), sex offenses (Sexual Offences Act 2003, §§ 14, 62), criminal damage 
(Criminal Damage Act 1971, § 3), burglary (Theft Act 1968, § 25), and fraud (Fraud Act 2006, § 2; 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981, § 1). 
11 The list is long but includes possession of weapons (Firearms Act 1968, § 1; Prevention of Crime Act 
1953, § 1; Criminal Justice Act 1988, § 139), glorifying terrorism (Terrorism Act 2006, § 1(1)-(3)), handling 
stolen goods (Theft Act 1968, § 22), money laundering (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, § 327), failure to 
report terrorism (Terrorism Act 2006, § 38B), and failure to report money laundering (Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002, § 330). 
12 For a discussion of how poorly possession offenses fit in doctrinal categories, see Markus D. Dubber, 
The Possession Paradigm, in Defining Crimes: Essays on the Criminal Law’s Special Part 91 (R.A. Duff & 
Stephen P. Green eds., 2005). 
13 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, §§ 2-4. 
14 Sexual Offences Act 2003, §§ 104-113; id. §§ 114-122; id. §§ 123-129. 
15 Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, §§ 1-14. 
16 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, § 1. 
17 Football (Disorder) Act 2000, sched. 1. 
18 Serious Crime Act 2007, §§ 1-37. 
19 For a discussion, see Peter Ramsay, The Insecurity State: Vulnerable Autonomy and the Right to Security 
in the Criminal Law 187 (2012). 
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found in the paradigm of formal agency by anticipating the commission of an externalized 
choice to deny rights before it occurs. In other words, they permit the authorities to sub-
stitute incapacitation of the dangerous for retribution against rights denial, as far as is 
possible.20 Their effect is to put a cordon of public welfare-type offenses oriented to harm 
prevention in front of the offenses belonging to formal agency, leaving the retributive law 
to come into play only where criminal harms have not been successfully prevented. In an 
effort entirely to surround the retributive law with harm-prevention measures, sentencing 
powers were reformed in 2003 to add an indefinite period of imprisonment for public 
protection, over and above the proportionate retributive sentences, to last as long as a 
convicted offender was thought to be dangerous.21 Being a dangerous person is the  
explicit reason for deprivation of liberty in these sentences.22  
Another category of offenses punishes the manifestation of dangerousness by criminal-
izing the causing of distress or anxiety to others whether by deliberate threats,23 
unreasonable conduct,24 or even merely risking these feelings in others.25 These offenses 
allow punishment for violating or risking the violation of others’ feelings of security. It may 
be that subjective security can be understood as an agency good, but the interesting aspect 
of these offenses is that there is no requirement to prove that any perception of insecurity 
caused or risked was a reasonable one, suggesting that the interest in security that they 
protect need not be common to all subjects, and that these offenses are not therefore 
consistent with liberal public reason.26 
Equally striking are recent reforms to sexual offenses, such as rape, sexual as-
sault, and assault by penetration. Under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, liability for these 
offenses no longer requires proof of subjective mens rea with respect to the circumstance 
that the complainant did not consent. It is enough to prove that the defendant’s belief 
in consent was not one that the reasonable person would have formed in the circum-
stances, enough to prove that the defendant’s belief in consent was a negligent one. In 
other words, under English law, the very serious imprisonable offenses of rape and sex-
                                                 
20 Unless, that is, subjects have acquired a right to security and dangerousness has itself become a wrong, in 
which case incapacitation and retribution have been merged. See Section IV below. 
21 Criminal Justice Act 2003, § 225. 
22 The practical strain imposed on the prisons by these sentences led to their subsequent reform, with 
indeterminate sentences retained only for the most serious offenders, and determinate periods for 
dangerousness made available for the less serious. Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012, pt. 3, ch. 5. 
23 Public Order Act 1986, § 4A; Malicious Communications Act 1988, § 1; R. v. Ireland; R. v. Burstow, 
[1998] A.C. 147 (House of Lords confirming the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R. v. Constanza, [1997] 2 
Cr. App. R. 492, that assault includes causing another person to fear unlawful violence at some time “not 
excluding the immediate future”). 
24 Protection from Harassment Act 1997, § 2. 
25 Public Order Act 1986, § 5. 
26 See Ramsay, supra note 19, at 206-08. 
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ual assault are now defined so as to include what for Brudner is at most the public wel-
fare offense of negligent sexual assault.27 
In the U.K.’s penal law, as it currently stands, the relations of mutual dependence 
through which agency goods are secured, the relations that characterize the paradigm of 
real autonomy, have not overrun formal agency and entirely substituted themselves for 
legal retributivism. Rather, they are laying siege to the relations of independent formal 
agents, surrounding them with preventive coercion. This prevalence of preventive offens-
es is not a phenomenon limited to U.K. law.  
Brudner briefly acknowledges Markus Dubber’s account of the predominance of 
the “police power” model in the U.S. (PF, 301), in which criminal law serves to identify 
and incapacitate threats.28 Günther Jakobs has demonstrated the longstanding “policifica-
tion” of German criminal law.29 These examples indicate that dialogic community is 
unable to explain the penal regimes of these two significant broadly liberal states. These 
examples could possibly be explained away. Arguably, the U.S. never got very far towards 
the dialogic community, so that it is unsurprising that its penal law remains inconsistent 
with it.30 Germany, with its extensive postwar welfare state, presents a more challenging 
example, although both its civilian legal traditions and experience of fascism may go some 
way to explaining the differences between its legal regime and Brudner’s dialogic liberal-
ism.31 Nevertheless both these examples tend to suggest that Brudner’s theory is 
essentially a normative theory with limitations as an explanatory theory.  
The example of the U.K., however, presents a more severe challenge to Brudner’s 
theory. The U.K. is the original common law system. It had not only developed a welfare 
state with an extensive legal paradigm of real autonomy, but in the postwar period had 
incorporated these institutions as a core aspect of its national identity. The contemporary 
expansion of penal harm-prevention in the U.K. has occurred long after its process of be-
coming a dialogic community.  
Perhaps Brudner could argue that these developments in U.K. law do not chal-
lenge the fundamentals of his theory since there is always likely to be a gap between the 
ideal and the actual, especially in the criminal law, where “anxieties about personal safety 
are at issue” (PF, 15). Moreover, he also hopes that his own theory, because it is grounded 
in the rights of a liberal constitution rather than in morality, could be taken up by the  
                                                 
27 See Brudner, supra note 9, at 505-06. 
28 See Markus D. Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims’ Rights (2002). 
29 See Günther Jakobs, On the Theory of Enemy Criminal Law, in Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal 
Law 415 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014).  
30 For Dubber, the police power is a survival of ancient pre-liberal ideas of sovereignty. See Markus D. 
Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and the Foundations of American Government (2005). 
31 Brudner hints that Europe experienced a “totalitarian” overextension of the paradigm of real autonomy in 
the first half of the twentieth century (Brudner, supra note 3, at 153-55) and, according to Jakobs, penal laws 
from that period have persisted in Germany. 
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judiciary to create the possibility of constitutional judicial review of substantive criminal 
law that might correct errors such as these (PF, 327-28).  
The difficulty with such a response is that the siege of formal agency is too con-
sistent and well-established a pattern to be dismissed as an aberration or failure to reach 
an ideal. If we investigate the reason for this development, we will find that it lies precisely 
in the tension between, on the one hand, the paradigm of real autonomy and, on the  
other, the interests of those persons who, on Brudner’s account, are the perfection of 
formal agency. This tension, far from being overcome in a dialectical synthesis, has already 
brought down the dialogic community in the U.K. Moreover, this breakdown of the old order 
has been accompanied by the emergence of a new judicial doctrine that serves the judici-
ary’s institutional needs in the new penal order, suggesting that judges may not have much 
interest in Brudner’s theory of their past.  
III. The Conflict of the Paradigms in Political Economy 
Brudner’s detailed arguments for the logical interdependence of the paradigms of freedom 
are impressive. However, even if he is right that there is no logical imperative for conflict 
between the paradigms, the siege of formal agency by real autonomy has nevertheless 
arisen, and this has occurred because the philosophic logic of right is not enough to account 
for the actual historical development of liberal societies and their paradigms of freedom.32 
As Brudner recognizes, the relations of formal right imply the existence of certain specific 
socio-logical circumstances. It is the logic of these circumstances that gives rise to the conflict 
between the paradigms. To understand this, we need to consider the wider implications of 
the paradigm of real autonomy, going beyond the criminal law, because it is here that the 
tension between the paradigms has proven to be politically unmanageable, and this is the 
ultimate source of the siege of formal agency in the penal law.  
The paradigm of real autonomy, it will be recalled, arises from the need to ensure 
that the individual person is not only free to choose ends but also actually able to pursue 
ends they have authored. One form this paradigm takes is the public welfare offenses. 
These amount to coercive interferences in the freedom of formal agents to make con-
tracts with each other, and otherwise to use or dispose of their property, in order to deter 
excessive risk creation. However, such interferences with the rights of formal agency are 
not limited to the criminal law. Brudner explores the implications of real autonomy for 
the private law in Unity of the Common Law, and in Constitutional Goods he elaborates an ex-
tensive set of social and economic rights that real autonomy requires to be protected as 
constitutional rights.  
For Brudner, as for Hegel, the most basic institutional form of freedom is proper-
ty ownership, and the exchange of property for value. Exchange in particular establishes 
the independence of human beings from the world of objects, perfecting their person-
hood and formal agency. By exchanging with each other what they each have exclusive 
                                                 
32 Alan Norrie, Law, Ideology and Punishment: Retrieval and Critique of the Liberal Ideal of Criminal 
Justice 80-81 (1991). 
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rights to possess, the parties to a contract realize their independence of objects in their 
mutual recognition of each other’s rights to possess or alienate an object at will. This in-
dependence is perfected for Brudner when proprietors enter into executory contracts, ex-
exchanging “promises to deliver equivalents in the future” (UCL, 127) rather than objects 
here and now. In the executory contract a person’s end-status is not embodied in posses-
sion of a material object but in the “intellectual possession of … exchange value” (UCL, 
128). Exchange value itself takes physical form in the symbolic tokens of paper and metal 
currency, and these have in recent times further retreated from materiality into the elec-
tronic data held in banks’ computer systems (UCL, 127). Exchange of private property is 
the acme of personhood in the paradigm of formal agency, and the more removed from 
the materiality of objects this exchange is, the more perfected the personhood achieved. 
Brudner recognizes that one unavoidable implication of this centrality of property 
and its exchange to freedom is that some persons will come to own the objects required 
for the production of the necessities of life—the means of production—while others will 
lack them. The latter will own only their capacity to work and whatever they can get in 
exchange for offering up that capacity on the market for labor (CG, 260).33 He further 
recognizes the force of Karl Marx’s critique of the wage-labor contract as one that takes 
place between formally free agents but that nevertheless creates a heteronomous relation 
between the employer and the employee. This is because the employee is abstractly free as 
a formal agent not to sell his capacity to labor; but if the person who owns only their ca-
pacity to labor fails to sell it then (in the absence of some other access to resources) she 
will starve. Formal agency leaves the propertyless free to work for another or to die. As a 
consequence there is an element of real compulsion in the wage-labor relation: wage-
earners must accept the employer’s despotic organization of the working day; work to re-
alize the employer’s chosen ends rather than their own; be unable to pursue their own 
ends (assuming a competitive labor market with some level of unemployment holds wages 
to subsistence levels); and finally, having accumulated no wealth, pass on the same fate to 
their children (CG, 261). The perfection of personhood in the exchange of commodities 
leads to real heteronomy for many persons. 
These labor market conditions compel the liberal state to various interventions in 
order to ensure the real autonomy of wage-earners. For Brudner, these include a degree of 
industrial democracy (UCL, 133) and numerous social and economic rights, such as very 
extensive rights to education, family and maternity support, and protection from uninsur-
able accident or illness (CG, 265-67). Two of these economic rights are worth spelling out 
in detail:  
[A] guaranteed minimum income payable to everyone regardless of wealth at a level suffi-
cient to liberate the mind from preoccupation with the necessities of life and from 
dependence on those who would otherwise control the means of life (CG, 264). 
                                                 
33 In The Insecurity State, I erroneously implied that Brudner did not take any account of the implications of 
the wage-labor contract for the paradigm of real autonomy. See Ramsay, supra note 19, at 237. He does 
recognize it, and not only in Constitutional Goods but also in Punishment and Freedom. See Brudner, supra note 
1, at 225-26. 
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[A] legal framework facilitating the equalization through collective action by workers of 
their bargaining power with that of managers of capital and prescribing minimum stand-
ards for wages, hours, and safety for workers who bargain individually. The pillars of this 
framework are, of course, the right of workers to bargain collectively and thus to require 
all workers in a bargaining unit to join the union, the right to strike … and the right to 
picket peacefully to back negotiating positions (CG, 265). 
These are indeed conditions of real autonomy for wage-earners, and they create a real dif-
ficulty for their employers, the profit-dependent owners of the means of production. Not 
only are the resources to fund these guarantees found by taxing the share of social prod-
uct that would otherwise go to profits, but such a guarantee of real autonomy, precisely 
because it eliminates the wage-earners’ vulnerability to heteronomy in the labor-market, 
eliminates their “dependence on those who would otherwise control the means of life,” 
which is to say that it eliminates the employers’ most important asset in their contractual 
negotiations with wage-earners.  
If the state were to guarantee an income with the quality that Brudner argues is 
the condition of wage-earners’ real autonomy, then the threat of unemployment would 
lose its disciplining effect on organized labor. This problem is compounded by the fact 
that the resources necessary for the wage earners to enjoy “moral independence” of the 
employers (CG, 265) are not a naturally given fixed quantity but a historically relative level 
of consumption (which drugs and treatments should be made available without charge in 
public healthcare? how much and what sort of education? how high a level of state pen-
sion? and so on). They are a matter of political argument. Once constitutional guarantees 
of real autonomy are in place, wage-earners’ expectations are going to rise and the market 
economy is going to have to maintain high rates of growth if it is to cope with the politi-
cal demands of wage-earners for better living standards while returning a sufficient rate of 
profit to ensure continued private investment. If those rates of growth should falter then 
there is likely to be a “crisis of rising expectations.” Wage earners will be able to resist at-
tempts to force them to endure austerity conditions, this will threaten profits and, as a 
result, the confidence of private investors in an adequate return on their capital will fall, 
threatening the very investment that is needed to ensure sufficiently high growth.  
This is not a hypothetical possibility. Something like this happened in the late 
1960s and 1970s when the political deal that underpinned the postwar welfare state broke 
down in the U.K. and the U.S. When economic growth rates faltered, even the limited 
political guarantees enjoyed by the wage earners of that period proved to be too much for 
the profit-dependent owners. They were faced with effective strike waves by wage-earners 
who, in defending their share of the social product, enjoyed a high degree of confidence 
gained over two decades of politically guaranteed full employment, unemployment bene-
fits, trade union power, and relative prosperity.34 In the U.K. and the U.S., business and its 
political representatives turned to the solutions advocated by the followers of classical lib-
eral F.A. Hayek. In the late 1970s and 1980s they withdrew from the postwar social 
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contract and attacked the institutions of the dialogic community, abandoning full em-
ployment, ending cooperation with organized labor, and breaking the market power of 
the unions in a series of set-piece confrontations. This “neoliberal counter-revolution” 
has since spread across most of the globe.  
In other words, the liberal legal and political order that Brudner is describing is the 
order that postwar welfare states aspired to attain: one which sought to reconcile the claims 
of negative civil and property rights, on the one hand, with positive social and economic 
rights, on the other.35 Brudner is correct to argue that such a political order is the most 
complete realization of the liberal idea of freedom. However, actual dialogic communities 
did not fall from the heavens of rational thought but needed concrete political forces to de-
liver them. The necessary political basis of this order has already broken down. In recent 
decades, liberal democracies have not been moving towards such a political order but away 
from it.36 State welfare is increasingly made available not as a right but on a conditional basis 
as “workfare.” Statutory minimum wages and state pensions are at levels that are too low to 
come close to “liberating the mind from … dependence on those who would otherwise 
control the means of life.” Real wages for most are stagnating, and the collective bargaining 
power of wage-earners has declined dramatically, along with the membership and activity of 
trade unions, with some Western states very actively attacking the privileges that trade  
unions once enjoyed. Industrial democracy is a very marginal concern.  
This process is not an even one. It has been much more advanced in the U.K. and 
the U.S., a more recent development in continental Europe, but nowhere has the postwar 
settlement between capital and labor persisted unscathed. Many institutional features of wel-
fare states—transfer payments, pensions, public healthcare and education, and so on—
persist. Nevertheless, the politics of the dialogical community that underpinned the “golden 
age” of the welfare state have broken down as a consequence of a fundamental sociological 
tension between the liberal conditions of formal agency (private property in the means of 
production), on the one hand, and the real autonomy of the majority of the population 
(“moral independence” of wage-earners from the ends of the owners of the means of pro-
duction), on the other. As that tension unravels we have witnessed the retreat of the 
paradigm of real autonomy in the sphere of social and economic rights from the positions 
that Brudner would have it occupy, while at the same time in the penal sphere, real auton-
omy has advanced into the territory reserved for formal agency by Brudner.  
Brudner’s painstaking elaboration of the dialogic community’s inner liberal ra-
tionale allows us to specify the tension that brought it down with some precision. Left to 
itself, a competitive labor market ensures that wages are reduced to a level at which all of 
a wage-earner’s life will be spent heteronomously serving the employer’s ends (either di-
rectly by producing the “surplus” exchange value that is the source of the employers’ 
profits or indirectly by producing the exchange value that pays for what is necessary to 
                                                 
35 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1992). 
36 For a summary of the challenges faced by welfare states since the 1970s, see F.G. Castles et al., 
Introduction, in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State 1 (F.G. Castles et al. eds., 2010). 
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reproduce the wage-earners’ capacity to labor to produce profit for the employer).37 The 
legal rights of real autonomy can give back some of the wage-earner’s time of life to ends 
that she sets for herself by, one way or another, transferring some of the surplus value 
(that would otherwise become profit) to the wage earner, although always subject to the 
condition that some of the wage-earner’s life must be given up to the ends of her  
employer. But this dialogic community can be purchased only at the price of radically 
constraining the power of the employers to dictate the terms of employment, and inciting 
a general willingness to question the authority of the profit-dependent owners over the 
lives of wage earners.38 The dialogic synthesis was unstable because it could only persist 
for as long as productivity and profit growth were strong and profit expectations  
restrained, and these conditions did not hold for long in the uneven and cyclical condi-
tions of the market system.  
These logical relations explain the history of the dialogic community’s fall. When 
the necessary economic conditions ceased to hold, the fundamental problem asserted  
itself: that those who, according to Brudner, most perfectly personify formal agency—the 
owners of money capital who exchange it for ownership of profit-producing assets or 
promises to repay with interest—lacked sufficient interest in the real autonomy of wage-
earners. Instead they resorted to the methods of class conflict. By contrast, unlike the 
owners of the means of production, the movement of organized labor entirely identified 
with the welfare state’s dialogic community, becoming one of its core institutions (as 
Brudner’s analysis in Constitutional Goods explains). The downfall of the dialogic communi-
ty destroyed the institutional basis of the workers’ movement and left wage-earners 
without any distinctive political alternative of their own. Wage-labor subsequently lost any 
distinctive political presence as a social class.  
I have labored these points a little because it is important to grasp how decisively 
the social basis of the dialogic community’s philosophic logic has broken down in West-
ern democracies. Without recognizing this, the development of our current penal state is 
hard to understand because the particular elements of the old dialogic order, the surface 
features of the welfare state, have not simply disappeared. Following the political resolu-
tion of the conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s, there has been a long process of decay as the 
tension between the social interests lying behind each paradigm has unraveled. It is this 
process of decay that explains the specific form taken by the breakdown of dialogic com-
munity, a retreat of the paradigm of real autonomy in economic and industrial policy 
accompanied by its advance in the penal sphere. I will describe this decay briefly because it 
explains why Brudner’s hopes for the judiciary as defenders of the dialogic community’s 
penal law may be misplaced and misleading.39 
                                                 
37 1 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy ch. 7, § 2 (Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., 
1967) (1867) (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/index.htm).  
38 Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State 143-44, 149-52 (1984). 
39 For more detailed accounts, see Ramsay, supra note 19 (esp. chs. 5, 6 & 10); Peter Ramsay, Pashukanis 
and Public Protection, in Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law 199 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014).  
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IV. Decay and Simulacrum 
The neoliberal overthrow of the welfare state’s compromise destroyed the dialogic legiti-
macy for coercive state power. In so doing, it necessitated a new politics of legitimation. 
However, neoliberals found that they could not reinvigorate a classical liberal account of 
freedom—one shorn of any concern for self-determination or autonomy—as a practical 
source of political legitimacy. The underlying reason for this failure is demonstrated by 
Brudner’s own work, especially in Unity of the Common Law: once the Hegelian account has 
been institutionalized, the libertarian account of freedom is plainly inferior. A revival of 
libertarianism would have been possible only with support from older non-rational and 
traditional sources of legitimacy, as Hayek persistently argued.40 However, since the 1980s, 
these sources have shown themselves to be insufficiently influential to do the legitimating 
work required of them.41 A different solution to the legitimation problem nevertheless 
became available because, as noted above, the neoliberal counter-revolution, in destroying 
the old structure of political legitimation, also destroyed the political basis of the working 
class movement. The elimination of wage-labor as a political movement made possible the 
recycling of the idea of real autonomy in a form less immediately threatening to the interests of 
the owners of the means of production.  
The new order has redefined citizens in neoliberal form as consumers.42 For these 
consumer-citizens, autonomy lies in being able to realize their identities from the plurality 
of available lifestyles in the consumer society. In this process of self-realization, their au-
tonomy is intrinsically vulnerable to the undermining of their self-esteem by others’ failure 
to respect their broadly defined security needs.43 Moreover, as consumers of public  
services, citizens are constructed as consumers of the state’s criminal justice services, and, 
in the process, redefined as potential victims of crime. As Jonathan Simon points out, the 
vulnerability of the representative citizen to crime comes to “define the appropriate con-
ditions for government intervention.”44 This is a neoliberal imitation of “public reason.” 
The interest that is necessarily shared by those defined by their potential victimhood is 
protection from harm. Indeed, where citizens are defined by their vulnerability to crime, 
their perception of their security will be understood as an agency good, grounding a right to be 
free from fear, a right to security. This in turn implies a public wrong of causing insecurity 
                                                 
40 See F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 152 (1994); 3 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty 167 (1979); 
F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit 135-37 (1988). 
41 Losing your enemies is a danger for any political tradition. But to have any understanding of 
contemporary developments, it is essential to face up to an obvious fact that liberal and leftist 
commentators seem reluctant to admit: the very limited political appeal of conservative traditionalism in the 
West (outside some parts of the U.S., perhaps). See Ramsay, supra note 19, ch. 5. 
42 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy ch. 5 (2004); Wolfgang Streeck, Citizens as Customers: Considerations on 
the New Politics of Consumption, 76 New Left Rev. 27 (2012); Keith Faulks, Citizenship in Modern Britain 
134 (1998); Ramsay, supra note 19, at 102-05. 
43 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (1991). 
44 Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy 
and Created a Culture of Fear 76 (2007). 
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to others by being dangerous, and explains the practical political legitimacy of the exten-
sive regime of preinchoate and harassment offenses outlined above. Formal agency 
remains a necessary aspect of this order, but now it appears inverted as an ever-present 
threat of harm to vulnerable consumer-citizens. For this reason, “vulnerable autonomy” 
might be an appropriate name for this recycled real autonomy.  
Vulnerability has become the dominant motif in U.K. criminal justice policy, and not 
only in criminal justice policy. All sorts of welfare interventions and claims on public re-
sources are now framed in terms of the vulnerability of the claimant to some harm or other.45 
The abandonment of dialogic community as the rationale for state power has eliminated the 
old limitations on the harm principle, allowing it to run riot as an expansive principle of gov-
ernment action. In this way, the new order presents a simulacrum of dialogical politics, in which the 
autonomy of “vulnerable groups” is promoted by supporters of state welfare and regulation. 
In many cases, these groups will receive some protection in the form of penal law or other 
welfare rights. However, such protection is always on terms dictated by the underlying  
acceptance of the neoliberal precondition that investor confidence in future revenue streams 
should not be undermined by the real autonomy of wage-earners.  
The new order, therefore, retains a formal commitment to rights and the rule of 
law. Its legal ideology is provided by human rights, which substitute themselves for the 
citizens’ rights of the dialogic community. These human rights are the rights of persons to 
have their formal agency upheld within the limit of the rights of vulnerable others to have 
harms prevented.46 It is in the balancing of these conflicting claims that the judiciary has 
found itself a new doctrine of proportionality. This doctrine provides the key element of 
most contemporary thinking about constitutional review.47 It permits the judiciary to con-
tinue in its role as the adjudicators of rights claims, but in a manner wholly compliant with 
the new order, since proportionality doctrine is designed to give constitutional sanction to 
“limitations” on the civil liberties of formal agency where those limitations are “neces-
sary” for the purposes of harm prevention.  
The new order is itself far from coherent and may not be especially long lasting. It is 
only what has arisen from the decay of the old order. Brudner would be right to say that such 
an order can neither serve the independence of individual citizens nor the common good. As 
I have argued elsewhere, the reliance of this structure of state power on casting formal agency 
in the role of a threat can only undermine the coherence of civil society; while the relentless 
promotion of the citizens’ vulnerability can only undermine the sovereignty of the state.48  
                                                 
45 Kate Brown, “Vulnerability”: Handle with Care, 5 J. Ethics & Soc. Welfare 313 (2011). 
46 See Ramsay, supra note 19, ch. 6. All these contemporary conditions distinguish the present period from 
the “totalitarian” assertion of real autonomy, which Brudner implies afflicted societies based on the 
exchange of private property in the mid-twentieth century; see Brudner, supra note 3. The contemporary 
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48 Ramsay, supra note 19, ch. 10. 
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Despite its weak rationale, it has nevertheless served to legitimate state power in the period of 
the decay of the old order by recycling its elements.49 By simulating the dialogic community in 
a negative form, this order has drawn the critics of neoliberal order onto the safe ground of 
vulnerability claims, endlessly urging a politically enfeebled state to solve social problems. 
We are living in the long twilight of the liberal dialogic community. Its political basis 
has been destroyed, but familiar aspects of the old order persist in a caricatured form: a  
rhetorical commitment to freedom combined with a deepened dependence on a weak state. 
Brudner’s depiction of the complex and subtle shapes of the old order is poignant. He often 
paints his philosophy’s grey in grey in beautiful shades that honor the humanizing 
achievements of the liberal form of human life. All the same, the light is failing badly. 
V. Legal Retributivism After Dark 
Brudner’s theory is a theory of a form of social life that is passing away. Liberalism’s de-
cay has inverted the idea of formal agency into a permanent perception of threat; in the 
process, the free subjects of liberal order have been redefined as either vulnerable poten-
tial victims or dangerous risks. Even though the immediate prospects are not promising, 
the decay of the liberal order does not require us to give up on individual freedom. We 
need rather to put it on a new democratic conceptual basis.50 
Brudner’s legal retributivism has a great deal to offer to democratic theory because 
formal agency is a shared interest of all in a democratic sovereignty.51 Legal retributivism 
provides a basis for challenging the ideological grip of the harm principle, and the threat 
that this is posing to civil liberty in the present. Furthermore, a truly democratic sover-
eignty, while it has an interest in negating rights denials, has none in morally blaming 
offenders. A democracy that takes collective self-rule seriously will rather be mindful of its 
claim to take collective responsibility for social conditions, and will end the political mor-
alizing about crime. Finally, legal retributivism points towards the elimination of 
punishment. The purpose of punishment under legal retributivism is to realize the author-
ity of rights. The stronger is the state, the less of a challenge any particular offense will 
represent to the authority of those rights and the more the overall scale of proportional 
punishments will diminish.52 A state that was nothing other than the representative of its 
citizens in collective control of their own circumstances would be stronger than any state 
ever seen. Hegel’s logic suggests that it would have little need of any punishment at all. 
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